




GNSS RFI WG-FM Civil/Military 2022

Raffi Khatcherian

ATM Senior Expert Head of International Spectrum Management 31 May – 1 June 2022



- EUROCONTROL Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)
- 250 Participating Aircraft Operators
 - Coverage: Europe, Middle East, Northern Africa
 - Detail reports subject to confidentiality
- 2018 / 2019 trend: average of 10 GPS reports DAILY!
 - 2020 decrease due to reduced flights (COVID) and reporting

<u>Report Analysis</u>


RFI most probable cause in absence of GNSS constellation or solar issues, especially if multiple aircraft are affected in a region

GNSS RFI as detected by Airbus Aircraft




 Post-OPS Monitoring from participating aircraft operators

- 1 JAN 2021 to 31 DEC 2021
- RFI continues despite reduced pilot reports




This picture matches EVAIR Pilot Reports and has been "stable" since 2018

12/03/2022



Position quality indicators (NIC)



Recommendations:

- Close monitoring of CNS (especially systems relying on GNSS) in the area
- Use of GNSS contingency procedures
 - Use of alternate NAV means by airspace users
 - ATS to provide radar vectoring to impacted flights
 - Reduce capacity in the concerned areas if needed

EASA SIB 2022-02

- Affected systems and Recommendations to NAA, ANSP and AO:
 - Contingency plan incl alternative procedures in case of GNSS jamming or spoofing
 - Essential conventional navigation infrastructure, particularly ILS, are retained and fully operational
 - Proactive mitigation measures incl NOTAM
 - Collect information on GNSS degradations in order to promptly notify airspace users
 - Readiness to provide reliable surveillance
 - Flight crews promptly report to ATC
 - Assess operational risks and limitations linked to the loss of on-board GNSS
 - Verify the A/C position by means of conventional NAVAIDs
 - Revert to a conventional arrival procedure where appropriate
 - Ensure, in the flight planning and execution phase, the availability of alternative conventional arrival and approach procedures





GNSS RFI: Letter to the ITU BR



- GNSS RFI threat picture evolved from 2014 ("GPS always works") to one where now there are regular and repeated complaints from the operational community
 - 20% of Airbus flights on Europe Middle East routes encounter RFI
 - GNSS Spoofing no longer excluded as possible cause in some observed events
- EUROCONTROL Network Manager wrote to ITU BR and report on GNSS RFI affecting the European aviation network (Nov 2021)
 - While political realities are recognized, it is important to show that RFI events are seen, recorded and analysed
 - Aim is to make as much political pressure as possible about this matter at ITU
 - RFI report jurisdiction driven by aircraft state of registry, not necessarily RFI location
 - EUROCONTROL Letter supported by Cyprus, Poland and France



GNSS RFI: Response from the ITU BR and some follow up

- Response from the ITU BR
 - Reply to EUROCONTROL in January 2022
 - Director BR reported to ITU Radio Regulations Board
 - RRB agreed in March to issue a Circular to all ITU Member States to raise awareness on the current situation and recall ITU regulations
 - Will be part of ITU-BR report to WRC-23
 - Further support from States will be appreciated to increase political weight of the issue
- European paper to ICAO Assembly

"Improving Communication Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) Resilience through Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Interference Mitigation"

- Follow-up from 40th Assembly and ICAO State Letter 2020 / 089
 - Proposing Assembly Resolution in CNS Context (Appendix C to AR-35-15)
 - Support from European States requested through NMB
 - Aircraft: Better Complementary Integration of GNSS / INS / DME
 - Ground: Better Complementary Integration of ADS-B and SSR

Summary & Recommendations



- Despite the decrease of the number of pilot reports in 2021, GNSS interferences continue to affect aviation operations significantly and may increase further in the coming months
 - Noting that the initial peak of RFI near Ukraine in March has reduced again currently
 - GNSS RFI may escalate beyond "operational nuisance" if coinciding with unusual traffic pattern linked to Ukraine airspace closure
- Support from States to EUROCONTROL letter to ITU (in line with ITU process) quite limited so far
 - GNSS (GPS L1) is the main aviation infrastructure today
 - Absence of formal radio reports does not mean absence of problems
 - Important to maintain close connection with State radio regulator / Telecom ministry
 - Important to make political pressure especially if "cooperation among States" is limited
- EUROCONTROL developing automated, near-real time GNSS RFI reporting tools
 - Still struggling to figure out how this should be integrated into national and EUROCONTROL RFI reporting
 process in detail